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    ABSTRACT  
Despite the alleged triumph of legal realism and the empirical turn of 
closely related fields such as judicial behavior, a startling number of 
constitutional theorists continue to approach their work as a purely 
conceptual enterprise. This is particularly true of originalists, but it is true 
of many others as well. Indeed, much of normative constitutional theory as 
it is presently practiced resembles a recreational debating society more 
than a serious effort to improve the functioning of a massively complex 
modern society. If constitutional theory is to live up to its aspirations, a 
new reality-based approach is urgently needed. This brief Commentary 
makes the case for such an approach and offers practical suggestions for 
getting it off the ground. 
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INTRODUCTION 
For most fields of American legal scholarship, the centrality of 
empirical questions to the serious study of law is old news.
1
 Regrettably, 
one cannot say this of normative constitutional theory. Despite the alleged 
triumph of legal realism, despite the empirical turn of closely related fields 
such as judicial behavior, despite years of savage criticism of 
constitutional-theoretical navel-gazing, a startling number of constitutional 
theorists continue to approach their work as a purely conceptual enterprise. 
This is particularly true of originalists, but it is true of others as well. Over 
the past half century, a substantial fraction of normative constitutional 
theory has consisted of attempts to reason more or less deductively from 
one abstract ideal of democracy or another.  
This is deeply unfortunate. The object of normative constitutional 
theory is—or should be—to improve the functioning of a massively 
complex system of governance. Any progress in that direction will require 
sustained attention to the real-world institutions and social conditions 
through and on which constitutional law operates. Contrary to the view of 
some critics,
2
 normative theory has an important role to play in this effort. 
Data do not explain or—what is more important—evaluate themselves. 
But a far more rigorous engagement with empirical realities is necessary if 
normative theory is to make a useful contribution.  
Originalism is a perfect example. In recent years, a diverse group of 
prominent constitutional theorists has attempted to revive the old argument 
that our commitment to a written constitution entails an originalist 
approach to constitutional interpretation.
3
 This argument comes in various 
forms. Some depend on other controversial justifications for originalism. 
Some assume the very authority they purport to justify. But in its strongest 
form, the originalist argument from writtenness holds the possibility of 
providing an independent justification for originalism. The idea, which 
seems at least superficially plausible, is that only originalism can explain 
why we keep the written Constitution around.  
 
 
 1. See Lee Epstein et al., On the Effective Communication of the Results of Empirical Studies, 
Part I, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1811, 1816 (2006) (―To claim that empirical work is now a fundamental part 
of legal scholarship borders on the boring.‖). 
 2. E.g., Richard A. Posner, Against Constitutional Theory, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (1998) 
[hereinafter Posner, Against Constitutional Theory]; Richard A. Posner, Conceptions of Legal 
“Theory”: A Response to Ronald Dworkin, 29 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 377 (1997).  
 3. See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, An Originalism for Nonoriginalists, 45 LOY. L. REV. 611, 636 
(1999); KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION: TEXTUAL MEANING, ORIGINAL 
INTENT, AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 50–61 (1999); Jack M. Balkin, Abortion and Original Meaning, 24 
CONST. COMMENT. 291, 303 (2007). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol89/iss1/7
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This claim has been extremely influential in the New Originalism. 
Arguably, it is the most distinctive normative claim to come out of that 
movement. But it cannot be sustained on close examination. Indeed 
nothing, or virtually nothing, follows from our commitment to a written 
constitution. One can be committed to a written constitution in many ways 
and for many reasons—almost none of which entail an originalist 
interpretive approach. For example, one can be committed to the 
constitutional text as a conventionalist focal point; as a framework for 
common law interpretation; as a locus of popular constitutionalist 
discourse; or as one of many ingredients in a pluralist practice of 
constitutional adjudication. These approaches may or may not be superior 
to originalism on the merits, but each accords the written constitutional 
text an important role.
4
  
With the conceptualist castle of writtenness demolished, originalists are 
left with their old standbys: popular sovereignty and constraint. But the 
force of these normative justifications is substantially dependent on 
empirical considerations that no originalist has ever attempted to 
investigate systematically. This is especially true of the argument from 
constraint but also applies to the argument from popular sovereignty.  
As to popular sovereignty: What sort of constraints would original 
meaning place on contemporary majorities? How far would nonoriginalist 
decisions depart from the durable views of contemporary majorities? To 
what extent do any such views exist? And if they do not exist in 
meaningful numbers today, what is the likelihood they existed at the 
founding? To what extent do contemporary Americans identify themselves 
as members of a temporally extended American people? Is an originalist 
interpretive approach necessary—as a practical matter—to preserve the 
efficacy of future acts of popular sovereignty (either through the 
legislative process or constitutional amendment)?
5
  
As to constraint: Can any interpretive theory meaningfully constrain 
the decisions of individual judges? What about the decisions of a large, 
diverse, and politically appointed judiciary? How does originalism 
compare in this respect to other plausible alternatives? How does it 
compare with respect to practical consequences for the economy, foreign 
policy, and civil rights? Of course, few nonoriginalists have purported to 
 
 
 4. For an extended critique of originalist arguments from writtenness, see Andrew B. Coan, The 
Irrelevance of Writtenness in Constitutional Interpretation, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 1025 (2010).  
 5. See KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION: TEXTUAL MEANING, 
ORIGINAL INTENT, AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 156 (1999) (defending originalism as necessary to preserve 
the ―potential sovereignty‖ of present democratic majorities).  
Washington University Open Scholarship
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answer these questions either.
6
 Indeed, their existence is barely 
acknowledged by either side. This indifference to the actual functioning of 
American government is an embarrassment for constitutional theory.
7
  
The problem is hardly confined to originalism. Indeed, the most 
remarkable feature of originalist arguments is one they share in common 
with many, perhaps most, other normative constitutional arguments: they 
operate in blissful ignorance of the real-world institutions and social 
conditions through and on which constitutional law operates. Indeed, 
much of normative constitutional theory as it is presently practiced 
resembles a recreational debating society more than a serious effort to 
improve the functioning of a massively complex modern society. If this 
seems too harsh, consider: Who but an academic constitutional theorist 
would believe that abstractions like writtenness or binding law or popular 
sovereignty could shed meaningful light on how we should structure our 
constitutional system, without a rigorous examination of how that system 
functions in practice?  
The answer is almost certainly no one, or at least no reasonably 
informed person with even a modest inkling of the complexity of 
American government and the society it governs. This observation is 
hardly new,
8
 but the disconnect between normative constitutional theory 
and the empirical realities of constitutional practice remains sufficiently 
stark that it bears renewed emphasis. If constitutional theory is to live up 
to its aspirations, if it is to be worthy of the prodigious intellectual labors 
undertaken on its behalf, a new reality-based approach is urgently needed.  
As already mentioned, such an approach will have to consist of more 
than just empirical inquiry.
9
 Many of our constitutional disagreements 
obviously do have a large empirical dimension, but in a society as 
politically and ethically heterogeneous as the contemporary United States, 
plenty of difficult normative questions would remain even if all empirical 
 
 
 6. But see Jamal Greene et al., Essay, Profiling Originalism, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 356 (2011) 
(exploring public attitudes about originalism). 
 7. Portions of the preceding three paragraphs are adapted, with modifications, from Coan, supra 
note 4.  
 8. See, e.g., Barry Friedman, The Importance of Being Positive: The Nature and Function of 
Judicial Review, 72 U. CIN. L. REV. 1257 (2004); Posner, Against Constitutional Theory, supra note 2; 
Cass R. Sunstein, Must Formalism Be Defended Empirically?, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 636, 645–47 (1999) 
(arguing that interpretive formalism ―must be defended by empirical claims about the likely 
performance and activities of courts, legislatures, administrative agencies, and private parties‖); cf. 
NEIL K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS IN LAW, ECONOMICS, AND 
PUBLIC POLICY (1994) (emphasizing the complexity of institutional choice and its significance for 
constitutional theory). 
 9. See text accompanying supra note 2.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol89/iss1/7
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disagreement were miraculously resolved.
10
 Perhaps more important, 
normative considerations will strongly influence our response to the 
substantial empirical uncertainty that even our best investigative efforts 
will inevitably leave in their wake. Too often, however, the inevitability of 
empirical uncertainty has become an excuse for complacency. There are 
unquestionably times when we have no choice but to rely on rough 
assumptions, to confess ignorance, or to resort to crude heuristics from 
decision theory.
11
 But before we resign ourselves to any of these second-
best options, it is imperative that we exhaust all available empirical 
resources. A great many such resources are available in the literature of 
other disciplines, especially political science, but to date they have gone 
largely untapped by constitutional theorists, at least those in the legal 
academy.
12
 
With these considerations in mind, this Commentary offers a brief but 
hopefully suggestive sketch of what a reality-based approach to normative 
constitutional theory would look like in practice. As confirmation that the 
problem goes beyond originalism, Part I examines the unreality of one 
influential argument for popular constitutionalism. Part II briefly describes 
three bodies of literature in political science that have very substantial 
implications for this sort of normative argument but have gone largely 
untapped by constitutional theorists. Part III offers a few practical 
suggestions for getting a reality-based approach off the ground.  
 
 
 10. See Andrew B. Coan, Well, Should They? A Response to If People Would Be Outraged by 
Their Rulings, Should Judges Care?, 60 STAN. L. REV. 213 (2007) (making this point with reference to 
abortion).  
 11. See ADRIAN VERMEULE, JUDGING UNDER UNCERTAINTY (2006) (emphasizing the profound 
empirical difficulties of comparative institutional analysis and suggesting tools from decision theory as 
one response); Adrian Vermeule, Interpretation, Empiricism, and the Closure Problem, 66 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 698 (1999) (similar). 
 12. Noteworthy exceptions include Richard Pildes, Is the Supreme Court a Majoritarian 
Institution?, 2010 SUP. CT. REV. (forthcoming); BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE: HOW 
PUBLIC OPINION HAS INFLUENCED THE SUPREME COURT AND SHAPED THE MEANING OF THE 
CONSTITUTION (2009); SANFORD LEVINSON, OUR UNDEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION: WHERE THE 
CONSTITUTION GOES WRONG (AND HOW WE THE PEOPLE CAN CORRECT IT) (2006); Ilya Somin, 
Political Ignorance and the Countermajoritarian Difficulty: A New Perspective on the Central 
Obsession of Constitutional Theory, 89 IOWA L. REV. 1287 (2004). I do not include the interesting and 
rapidly proliferating empirical literature on judicial decision-making, see, e.g., Thomas J. Miles & 
Cass R. Sunstein, The New Legal Realism, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 831 (2008), because very little progress 
has been made toward integrating its findings into normative constitutional theory. But see Eric A. 
Posner, Does Political Bias in the Judiciary Matter?: Implications of Judicial Bias Studies for Legal 
and Constitutional Reform, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 853 (2008). Outside the legal academy, especially in 
political science, the situation is considerably brighter. For an illuminating overview, see Mark A. 
Graber, The Countermajoritarian Difficulty: From Courts to Congress to Constitutional Order, 4 
ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 361 (2008). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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I. THE UNREALITY OF CONTEMPORARY CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY 
Larry Kramer’s 2004 book The People Themselves is one of the richest 
works of American constitutional law scholarship in recent years. As an 
intellectual history, both its rigor and its vision are deeply impressive. As a 
call to arms against judicial supremacy, it both reflects and helped to effect 
a dramatic unsettling of the dominant paradigm in American constitutional 
thinking. Yet for all its virtues, and despite its apparently radical break 
with the recent past, the overtly normative portions of Kramer’s work 
share two important qualities with much of contemporary constitutional 
theory. First, highly abstract democratic ideals do most of the heavy 
lifting, and second, nowhere does he grapple in a serious or sustained way 
with the actual empirical functioning of the American political system. 
The most striking example of this occurs in the book’s closing chapter, 
where Kramer anticipates and responds to concerns that ordinary citizens 
are not capable of performing the demanding role his theory assigns to 
them. It is worth quoting at length: 
[M]ost contemporary commentators share a sensibility that takes for 
granted various unflattering stereotypes respecting the irrationality 
and manipulability of ordinary people and their susceptibility to 
committing acts of injustice. To those who believe in the 
stereotypes, such weaknesses of mind and character are inevitable 
―facts‖ that must be confronted and dealt with by those who would 
preserve democracy [as against judicial supremacy]. Accepting 
these facts, they say, is just being realistic.  
. . . . 
. . . [T]he choice one makes in this regard does not turn on evidence 
or logic, much as intellectuals on both sides of the question might 
want to believe otherwise. It turns . . . on differing sensibilities 
about popular government and the political trustworthiness of 
ordinary people.
13
 
In one sense, Kramer is clearly right. The disagreements among 
supporters and proponents of judicial supremacy, as they have actually 
played out in contemporary constitutional theory, have largely been a 
matter of competing sensibilities. If you are an elitist snob, as Kramer sees 
it, you will tend to believe ordinary citizens are incapable of governing 
 
 
 13. LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND 
JUDICIAL REVIEW 244, 246 (2004). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol89/iss1/7
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themselves without powerful judicial restraints. If you are a naïve or 
politically opportunistic populist, as Kramer’s opponents see it, you will 
tend to believe popular constitutional interpretation both feasible and 
desirable. To put the point more dispassionately, if you instinctively trust 
ordinary people to make reasonably good decisions about their own social 
life, you are likely to side with Kramer; if not, you are likely to side with 
his opponents. This is a perfectly apt description of contemporary debates 
in constitutional theory. 
What is missing from this picture is any sense that things could be 
otherwise—any sense that normative constitutional theory could aspire to 
be more than a battle of sensibility-driven intuitions. After all, the issues 
that divide Kramer and his opponents have a very substantial empirical 
dimension. How likely are ordinary citizens to have strong opinions about 
constitutional issues? To the extent they do have such opinions, how likely 
are they to be factually informed, internally coherent, and stable over 
time? How do judges and other political officials compare to ordinary 
citizens on these questions? How do they compare to each other? And how 
do the substantive outcomes rendered by courts and other institutions 
compare with the views of ordinary citizens? None of these questions can 
be answered with Archimedean precision and perhaps some cannot be 
answered at all. Even if they could all be answered, there would still be 
much room for disagreement between Kramer and his adversaries. Surely, 
however, the answers would bear in a very substantial way on the nature 
and scope of that disagreement.  
Yet Kramer shows no more curiosity about them than does the 
originalist argument from writtenness. It is as if he were discussing a point 
of religious dogma rather than the fate of a massively complex working 
constitutional system with far-reaching practical consequences for 
hundreds of millions of people.
14
 This is not meant to single out Kramer 
for special criticism. To the contrary, his work is among the very best 
contemporary constitutional theory has to offer. That work of this caliber 
could be so fundamentally detached from reality is a mark that something 
is seriously amiss. We can and should do better.
15
 
 
 
 14. It is telling, in this regard, that Kramer invokes Sanford Levinson’s concept of ―constitutional 
faith.‖ Id. at 247.  
 15. In fairness to Kramer, the passage I criticize is drawn from the concluding chapter of a book-
length work whose primary focus is historical rather than normative. This would certainly excuse 
Kramer for not following up every difficult empirical question raised by his argument. It cannot, 
however, explain his apparent failure to appreciate that such questions exist and that his argument 
turns crucially on the answers. Significantly, his more overtly normative work exhibits a similar blind 
spot. See Larry D. Kramer, Popular Constitutionalism, circa 2004, 92 CAL. L. REV. 959 (2004); Larry 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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II. UNTAPPED EMPIRICAL RESOURCES 
The political science literature is a good place to start. Of course, the 
interests of political scientists are hardly identical to the interests of 
constitutional theorists. But for several decades, they have been carefully 
examining a great many of the empirical questions that constitutional 
theorists have been content to ignore or, more typically, make undefended 
assumptions about. Three bodies of the political science literature, in 
particular, bear directly on the issues in dispute between Kramer and his 
theoretical adversaries.  
A. The Supreme Court and Public Opinion 
The first analyzes the relationship between Supreme Court decisions 
and public opinion.
16
 Constitutional theorists have long been dimly aware 
of this literature, the dominant theme of which is that the Supreme Court 
has never been the formidable countermajoritarian force it is commonly 
portrayed as. To a shocking extent, however, they have continued to write 
and think about the Court as either a bulwark against tyranny of the 
majority or an incipient antidemocratic tyrant in its own right.
17
  
Kramer’s writings are an excellent case in point. In both The People 
Themselves and an influential Harvard Law Review Foreword,
18
 he 
savages the late Rehnquist Court for usurping Congress’s democratic 
authority to remedy civil rights violations under the Fourteenth 
Amendment. This critique has a complicated and quite compelling legal 
basis, but its substantial rhetorical power stems chiefly from Kramer’s 
charge that the Court has been flagrantly overriding the will of the people. 
This may be true—and perhaps requires little empirical demonstration—in 
 
 
D. Kramer, Foreword: We the Court, 115 HARV. L. REV. 4 (2001) [hereinafter Kramer, Foreword]. 
Again, the point is not to single out Kramer for special criticism. It is to demonstrate that the unreality 
that characterizes constitutional theory generally extends even to the very best work in the field. 
 16. The classics of this literature are ROBERT DAHL, A PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY 
(1956); THOMAS R. MARSHALL, PUBLIC OPINION AND THE SUPREME COURT (1989); Gregory A. 
Caldeira & James L. Gibson, The Etiology of Public Support for the Supreme Court, 36 AM. J. POL. 
SCI. 635 (1992) [hereinafter Caldeira & Gibson, Etiology]. PUBLIC OPINION AND CONSTITUTIONAL 
CONTROVERSY (Nathaniel Persily, Jack Citrin & Patrick J. Egan eds., 2008) and GREGORY CALDEIRA 
& JAMES GIBSON, CITIZENS, COURTS, AND CONFIRMATIONS: POSITIVITY THEORY AND THE 
JUDGMENTS OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE (2009) are important recent contributions. But see Pildes, 
supra note 12 (sounding a cautionary note about simplistic application of this literature to normative 
questions in constitutional theory). 
 17. The most noteworthy exception is FRIEDMAN, supra note 12.  
 18. See Kramer, Foreword, supra note 15. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol89/iss1/7
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the case of City of Boerne v. Flores,
19
 which overturned a three-year-old 
law passed virtually unanimously by both houses of Congress. But in most 
of the other decisions Kramer criticizes, the statutes invalidated were 
much older and much less politically salient than the Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act struck down in Boerne. It is far from clear that these 
decisions were out of step with the values of contemporary Americans at 
the time they were decided. After all, those same Americans had elected 
Republican majorities in both houses of Congress and had three times 
elected Republican presidents who ran on platforms of limited federal 
power and appointed the conservative justices Kramer criticizes.  
A theoretical approach that took the political science literature 
seriously would be more sensitive to these facts and more circumspect, 
here and elsewhere, in ascribing to the Court a meaningfully 
antidemocratic role. It would also open up the tantalizing possibility that, 
in the decisions Kramer focuses on, the Court was itself engaged in a form 
of popular constitutionalism, curtailing federal civil-rights remedies that 
no longer enjoyed democratic support but could not be repealed 
legislatively due to the power of well-organized minority interests.  
And this barely scratches the surface. To give just one more example, 
taking the political science literature seriously would force Kramer to 
grapple with the high level of institutional support the Supreme Court 
generally enjoys even when the public disagrees with individual 
decisions.
20
 Perhaps this support suggests a popular constitutionalist 
choice in favor of judicial supremacy. Perhaps it has no implications for 
popular constitutionalism at all. But only if we take empirical realities 
seriously does the question even present itself for analysis. 
B. Voter Competence 
The second relevant body of literature examines levels of political 
knowledge and engagement among American voters.
21
 In broad brush, it 
paints a picture of an electorate that is intractably ignorant and apathetic 
about the vast majority of political issues, including constitutional issues. 
An important subdivision of this literature examines the evolution of 
 
 
 19. 521 U.S. 507 (1997). 
 20. In the political science literature, this phenomenon is known as ―diffuse support.‖ See, e.g., 
Caldeira & Gibson, Etiology, supra note 16, at 640. 
 21. Here the classics include MICHAEL X. DELLI CARPINI & SCOTT KEETER, WHAT AMERICANS 
KNOW ABOUT POLITICS AND WHY IT MATTERS (1996); ARTHUR LUPIA & MATTHEW D. MCCUBBINS, 
THE DEMOCRATIC DILEMMA: CAN CITIZENS LEARN WHAT THEY NEED TO KNOW? (1998); JOHN 
ZALLER, THE NATURE AND ORIGINS OF MASS OPINION (1992). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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public opinion over time and its sensitivity to ―framing effects‖—
basically, the language and the level of generality with which questions are 
framed. Again, the picture it paints is not edifying. To the limited extent 
that most ordinary Americans are aware of the political issues of the day, 
the opinions they express on them are frequently internally incoherent, 
unstable over relatively short spans of time, and extremely sensitive to the 
framing of questions.
22
 
Here too, however, normative constitutional theorists have paid 
depressingly little attention, preferring to fall back on ungrounded 
empirical intuitions and argument by salient historical anecdote.
23
 The 
passage from Kramer’s final chapter examined earlier is typical in this 
respect. It acknowledges the importance of citizen competence to the 
normative case for popular constitutionalism, which assigns ordinary 
citizens a demanding responsibility over constitutional interpretation. But 
it complacently assumes that the issue can be resolved only by intuition, 
ideology, or some sort of ―constitutional faith.‖24 For the most part, 
Kramer’s opponents tend to share this complacency, supporting their own 
empirical intuitions not with facts about the contemporary American 
electorate but a threadbare collection of historical cautionary tales, taken 
to illustrate the ignorance and intolerance of the masses. The list is 
familiar: Jim Crow, Japanese internment, McCarthyism, and now 
Guantanamo Bay. 
A theoretical approach that took the political science literature 
seriously might go a long way toward overcoming this ―stalemate of 
empirical intuitions.‖25 If the public has no stable or even coherent opinion 
on most constitutional issues, or if public opinion on such issues is deeply 
infected by factual ignorance, even popular constitutionalists may have to 
concede that democratic ideals have a limited role to play in allocating 
institutional authority over constitutional interpretation. Conversely, if the 
public does have informed, stable, and coherent opinions on some or many 
issues, democratic arguments against aggressive judicial review may have 
greater force, either in specific contexts or across the board. Of course, 
many other sources of disagreement will persist, but a shift in this 
direction would have profound implications for the debate. 
 
 
 22. See, e.g., James N. Druckman, The Implications of Framing Effects for Citizen Competence, 
23 POL. BEHAV. 225 (2001); Thomas E. Nelson & Donald R. Kinder, Issue Frames and Group-
Centrism in American Public Opinion, 58 J. POL. 1055 (1996). 
 23. An exception is Somin, supra note 12. 
 24. KRAMER, supra note 13, at 247. 
 25. This helpful term is Adrian Vermeule’s. See VERMEULE, supra note 11, at 153.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol89/iss1/7
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C. Political Accountability 
A third and closely related body of literature analyzes problems of 
legislative and executive accountability.
26
 Its key findings are similarly 
discouraging. Well-organized interest groups frequently outmaneuver 
diffuse majorities. The massive complexity of American government 
makes it extraordinarily difficult for voters to identify candidates who 
share their policy views or to punish elected officials who deviate from 
those views—or simply perform incompetently—once in office. 
Widespread ignorance and apathy compound the difficulty. To put the 
point succinctly, there is a huge amount of agency slack between voters 
and public officials. Crude heuristics based on party membership, interest 
group endorsements, and the like ameliorate but do not come close to 
eliminating the problem.
27
  
Constitutional theorists are familiar with some aspects of this literature, 
most notably theoretical arguments from public choice theory about the 
power of concentrated interest groups to shape legislative and 
administrative outcomes. But there is a vast body of empirical work on 
these topics that constitutionalists have done little to explore and even less 
to integrate into normative constitutional theory. Again, Kramer’s 
argument for popular constitutionalism is a helpful illustration. Just as he 
assumes that aggressive judicial review is countermajoritarian and that 
ordinary citizens are sufficiently informed and engaged (or capable of 
becoming so) to play an important role in constitutional interpretation, he 
assumes that legislative and executive processes are meaningfully superior 
to judicial processes from a democratic perspective. Of course, this is an 
assumption he shares with countless other constitutional theorists, as well 
as most government officials and judges. 
A theoretical approach that took the political science literature 
seriously would subject this assumption to rigorous empirical examination. 
The democratic argument for resolving constitutional issues through 
ordinary political processes turns in significant part on their presumed 
accountability advantage relative to courts. If that advantage is small or 
nonexistent, the democratic argument loses much of its force. Of course, 
 
 
 26. Here the classics include V.O. KEY JR., PUBLIC OPINION AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 
(1961) and Gerald H. Kramer, Short-Term Fluctuations in U.S. Voting Behavior, 1896–1964, 65 AM. 
POL. SCI. REV. 131 (1971). 
 27. See Jane S. Schacter, Political Accountability, Proxy Accountability, and the Democratic 
Legitimacy of Legislatures, in THE LEAST EXAMINED BRANCH 45–75 (Richard Bauman & Tsvi 
Kahana eds., 2006). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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the question may not be so simple. Perhaps a substantial accountability 
advantage exists in some contexts but not in others, in which case a more 
fine-grained democratic analysis might be required.
28
 Only an approach 
that takes empirical issues seriously can answer these questions. 
III. A SYNTHETIC APPROACH 
The central task of normative constitutional theory is to address 
practical questions of interpretive method and institutional design within 
the context of a massively complex working political system. This is 
impossible to do without understanding at a fairly fine degree of 
granularity how that system actually functions. It is also impossible to do 
without deep thinking about what goals the system ought to serve and 
why. Constitutional theorists have done a much better job at the second of 
these tasks, but as the preceding discussion has shown, their efforts have 
been distorted and undermined by a lack of attention to the first. A reality-
based approach must find a way to synthesize the two. This will not be 
easy. There are many reasons constitutional theory has made little progress 
toward this goal thus far, and the way forward will have to be worked out 
over a period of years, perhaps decades. The most important thing, for 
now, is to understand and commit to the goal. Nevertheless, it is possible 
to offer a few practical suggestions for getting underway.  
A. A New Empirical Awareness 
It is unnecessary for all or even most constitutional theorists to become 
experts in empirical methods and positive political theory. These are not 
now and probably never will be the comparative advantage of most 
constitutional theorists. In order to function effectively, however, it is 
crucial that every constitutionalist be at least minimally aware of the 
developments in political behavior and related fields and think carefully 
about their relevance to normative constitutional theory. If some 
constitutional theorists develop genuine expertise in these areas or if 
opportunities for cross-disciplinary collaboration present themselves, so 
much the better. Perhaps the most important thing in the near term is to 
cultivate a strong disciplinary awareness that the object of normative 
constitutional theory is a highly complex working system whose empirical 
 
 
 28. See Edward G. Carmines & James A. Stimson, The Two Faces of Issue Voting, 74 AM. POL. 
SCI. REV. 78 (1980) (explaining that the difficulty of issue voting varies with complexity of the issue 
in question). 
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realities are a nontrivial determinant of the normatively best approach. 
This alone will go a long way toward reconnecting normative theory with 
reality. 
B. The Role of Empirical Intuitions 
It is impossible to completely eliminate our reliance on empirical 
intuitions. The empirical questions constitutionalists confront are simply 
too numerous to subject every one to rigorous quantitative analysis. Even 
if it were possible do so, many empirical questions are extremely difficult 
or impossible to analyze in this way. In the worst cases, we might resort to 
formal heuristics for decision-making under uncertainty,
29
 though 
frequently our plausible intuitions will carry us further. In all cases, 
however, we should become much more conscious of the role that 
empirical intuitions play in our thinking about normative issues and much 
more explicit about the extent to which they inform our theoretical 
analysis. In fact, these should become central canons of a reality-based 
approach to constitutional theory.  
The more aware and explicit we are about the empirical assumptions of 
our analysis, the more we will appreciate the fragility of bold normative 
claims without firm empirical grounding. This, in turn, should increase our 
sense of urgency about rigorously investigating empirical questions when 
possible, as well as raise the disciplinary status of efforts in this direction. 
Carefully distinguishing empirical and normative claims might also help 
facilitate a new division of labor in constitutional theory, roughly akin to 
the division between applied and theoretical branches of other disciplines 
like physics and economics. So long as we understand the interdependence 
of theory and application, there should be no problem with specialization 
in one or the other. But understanding this interdependence is crucial.  
C. Exploiting Available Resources 
A great many of the empirical questions of interest to constitutional 
theorists are of little or no interest to other disciplines or are of interest in 
very different ways. Consequently, constitutional theory will eventually 
need to develop empirical methods and capabilities of its own. This, of 
course, will take time and sustained commitment. In the short-term, 
however, there is enough relevant empirical research (and positive theory) 
in other disciplines to keep constitutional theorists busy for some time. 
 
 
 29. See VERMEULE, supra note 11, at 180. 
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The political science literatures discussed in this Part are vast and have 
potentially huge implications for every normative approach grounded in 
some sense on democratic ideals. There is also a large political science 
literature on the determinants of judicial decision-making, which may 
likewise have substantial unexplored implications for constitutional 
theory.
30
 Cognitive psychology and neuroscience, too, have important 
lessons to teach on processes of human decision-making,
31
 which could 
cast important light on the capacity and limits of interpretive theory as a 
constraint on judicial decision-making. These are all resources that a 
reality-based approach to constitutional theory can and should tap more or 
less immediately. Of course, the process cannot be one of heedless 
appropriation. Refinement and repurposing will inevitably be required. 
But this is no reason to hesitate. It is merely cause to proceed carefully, 
with due regard for disciplinary differences. 
CONCLUSION 
Critics of normative constitutional theory are legion and they have a 
point. For far too long, far too many American constitutional theorists 
have proceeded in blissful ignorance of the actual workings of our political 
institutions. The originalist and popular constitutionalist arguments 
discussed in this Commentary are two examples of this broad tendency but 
hardly the only ones. Happily, the tendency is not without exceptions. 
Indeed, there are welcome signs that these exceptions are growing in 
number and significance. The next step is to consolidate and build on these 
gains, drawing on available resources from other disciplines. The process 
will not be easy, but if normative constitutional theory is to justify its 
continued existence, it is nothing short of essential.  
 
 
 30. See generally Miles & Sunstein, supra note 12. 
 31. See RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK (2008) (drawing on these fields and others to 
analyze processes of judicial decision-making). 
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